With Beijing and Islamabad signing at least 32 MOUs related to China Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC], it’s time for those who continue to believe that this ambitious USD 62 billion project will forever end Pakistan’s economic woes to celebrate. What must be even more exhilarating for the pro-CPEC camp is the news of Beijing’s willingness to roll out an “upgraded version” of CPEC in the second phase that will commence soon.

While CPEC certainly improved surface communication and power generation, yet this project hasn’t quite measured up to both Beijing and Islamabad’s repetitive claim of it being a “game-changer” even a decade after it was launched with much pomp and show. Hence, many are naturally wary of Beijing’s latest promise of an “upgraded version” of this project as lack of clarity on what it means raises several questions regarding this beguiling phrase.

If phase two of CPEC will be an “upgraded version”, then does it imply that first phase of this project has been executed using antiquated technology/outdated models, or is it just trying to assuage public disenchantment with this project by making tall promises? An “upgraded version” implies replacement of existing features with better and more efficient alternatives, and achieving this requires substantial investment in both terms of capital and time. So, will Beijing provide the proposed “upgraded version” without any associated cost escalation in the particular project?

If the answer is ‘No’, then where will Islamabad find the money for the “upgraded version” of CPEC? And if the reply is ‘Yes’, then isn’t it obvious that Beijing had craftily inflated the initial project estimates? This apprehension may sound outlandish but the CPEC ML 1 railway project aimed at reviving and redesigning construction of a 1,726 km long track from Karachi to Peshawar is a case in point. Originally pegged at USD 9.85 billion, it was subsequently reduced to USD 6.678 billion after Pakistani experts excluded extravagant and avoidable expenditures by focussing on critical aspects of the project.

Pakistan Railways achieved more than USD 3 billion savings by prioritisation and ingenuity while ensuring no dilution in the laid down objectives. Instead of upgrading all 630 level crossings, the most critical ones have been identified and instead of building new bridges over rivers, the comparatively much cheaper option of strengthening existing bridges has been incorporated. Though the tracks would have the designated speed limit of 140 km per hour, they would still be capable of supporting the desired speed of upto 160 Km per hour envisaged in the original plan!

Similarly, there are also compelling indications of exploitation in CPEC’s energy sector by Chinese independent power producers [IIPs]. In a well researched opinion paper titled ‘What drives Pakistan’s coal-fired power plant construction boom?: Understanding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s energy portfolio’, Rishikesh Ram Bhandary and Kelly Sims Gallagher have brought out the fact that besides other considerations, “availability of Chinese public finance to support coal-fired power plants to be the most important factors that shaped energy technology selection.”

The paper has also mentioned that “while Chinese actors have been responsive to the Pakistani government’s policy choices, they have also displayed financial risk aversion, which has translated into steep economic costs for Pakistan.” This observation is buttressed by the official revelation that the circular debt [money due to IPPs] as on January 1 this year has reached a whopping Rs 2.636 trillion, and while Islamabad is trying to give excuses like increase in imported coal prices and power loss/ theft, it’s evident that IPPs are exploiting Islamabad’s inability to call for an investigation due to fear of antagonising its “iron brother.”  

Former German career diplomat Dr Anne-Marie Schleich also believes that “For China, the construction and administration of coal-fired power plants within CPEC pose good alternative business opportunities abroad for its state-owned enterprises at a time when coal-fired power in China is being scaled down…” She has also highlighted Beijing’s duplicity on this issue, stating that “the focus on coal contrasts with China’s newly proclaimed domestic sustainability policy, yet China continues to be involved in coal power plants in its neighbourhood.”

So, while both Beijing and Islamabad have once again showered clichéd praises on each other, one wonders if the Pakistanis are really so gullible as to fall hook, line and sinker for China’s sweet talk and forget that the days of free lunches are long over, or is that being completely dependent on Beijing for loans to avoid debt defaults, cash-strapped Islamabad has no other choice but to dance to its “Iron Brother’s” tune?

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In yet another case exposing the grave human rights crisis facing religious minorities in Pakistan, a Hindu girl named Radhika became the latest victim of the disturbing practice of “conversion rape” on June 10.

Radhika was abducted, forcibly converted to Islam, and then married off to her abductor Tando Muhammad Khan in Sindh province. Her plight follows that of a minor named Noori, who was not only kidnapped and raped but also forcibly converted and married off to Muslim men Muhammad Ayub “Peer Ayubjan Sarhandi” and Luqman Mohib Junejo in separate incidents.

These cases are part of a deeply concerning pattern of forced conversions and marriages targeting minority Hindu and Christian girls in Pakistan, particularly in the Sindh region. Mounting evidence points to an organized campaign using sexual violence and coercion to entrap and exploit young girls from vulnerable communities.

Human rights activists have raised alarms over the climate of fear and oppression faced by minorities, who struggle to protect their children from such heinous crimes.

The issue has sparked outrage globally, and calls on Pakistan to take concrete action to safeguard the rights and freedoms of religious minorities. The world watches with mounting concern, calling for an end to the horrific practice of “conversion rape” and a future where no child is torn away from their family, faith, and future.

The administration of Pakistan-occupied Gilgit Baltistan (PoGB) has reportedly leased 37 rest houses in forest locations to Green Pakistan Tourism, a subsidiary of the Pak military, at questionable rates.

The rental rates are set at Rs. 7 lakh per month for 20 buildings from the Communication and Works Department and Rs. 1.35 lakh monthly for 17 properties spanning 450 acres from the Forest Department.

The insatiable urge of the Pakistan Army to run public affairs has led it to start a new company called Green Tourism Limited and going a step further, it has now taken dozens of tourism sites on long-term lease and is now planning to run hotels and other such facilities.

The leasing of 37 prime rest houses and vast tracts of forest land to Green Pakistan Tourism at rates that can only be described as exploitation. These properties, which should have been developed as public spaces and revenue generators for impoverished region, have been handed over to the military’s commercial interests on a silver platter.

POGB Properties

The military’s land acquisitions, including those under the guise of initiatives like the “Green Pakistan Initiative,” have negative impact on local communities and small-scale farmers. The Army’s methods of grabbing land in PoGB are multifaceted and often involve a combination of legal manoeuvres, coercion and strategic exploitation of resources.

The military often justifies land acquisition under the pretext of strategic infrastructure development. Incidentally, the Pakistan Army runs huge commercial entities all over the country, starting from gas and petrol stations to housing colonies. It also runs many industrial units and there is hardly a sector in which the Pakistan Army is not involved.

Projects such as roads, military bases, and communication networks are often used as a pretext to acquire land, sometimes without proper compensation or consultation with local communities.

The military often collaborates with civil authorities, including local governments and administrative bodies, to acquire land through legal or quasi-legal means. This collaboration involves influencing decision-making processes, manipulating land records, or using political pressure to secure land.

While POGB grapple with crumbling infrastructure, lack of basic amenities, and marginalization, the PoGB authorities have once again chosen to prioritize the insatiable greed of the all-powerful Pak Army over the well-being of its own people.