Many liberals today believe that a ban on Muslim veiling would be
inconsistent with liberalism. However, the chief architect of liberal political
philosophy, John Stuart Mill, who was also one of the nineteenth century’s
greatest feminists, probably would have accepted a ban in principle. Mill’s 19th
century England presented a different set of religious issues to those of
multicultural Britain today, but Mill considered three cases contemporaneous to
his writing that offer a prism through which we can discern how liberalism’s
founding father might have responded to the question of a state ban on Muslim
veiling.
First, he considers whether a ban on eating pork would be acceptable in
a Muslim minority country like his own. He concludes that the ban on
pork-eating would be unacceptable since many would want to resist the ban
because they do not accept Muslim disgust as legitimate grounds for preventing
other people from eating pork.
Next, Mill looked at the Christian Puritans’ ban on various forms of
recreation, such as music and dance. Mill remarked that the moral and religious
sentiments of Puritans were inadequate grounds to restrict other peoples’
leisure activities.
Finally, he considered the Mormon minority in the United States, who practiced (male only) polygamy and were persecuted for it. Mill’s response was that interference in the Mormon way of life would be unjustified on the condition that the practice is undertaken with the full consent of all participants. He also stipulated that it should be permitted only if people living in Mormon communities were free to leave.
The Mormon example can be extended to any case in which a host society
seeks to change the practices of a minority when those practices are not
enforced on people against their will. If we accept – as most people do – that
religious dress codes are sometimes forced on people against their
will, then, to that extent, according to Mill’s reasoning, the state would bejustified
in interfering with the practice, just as it would be in cases where the
practice of male polygamy did not have the full consent of those impacted by
it. This conclusion is consistent with the rationale of Mill’s
conditional ban on male polygamy, since the only condition that he thought would
make state interference in the practice acceptable was if women had not
fully consented to the practice and were not fully free to leave the
practicing community. If these conditions are met in the case of
the veil, for instance, then it is consistent with liberal political philosophy
to ban it.
No one should be made, by legal or political force, to conform to
ideological values that are not his or her own. So, while well-meaning British or
American citizens may argue that it is not OK to tell people what to wear (or
not to wear), the same goes for Salafi-Wahhabists and fundamentalists as well
as for the state and government officials.
A legal restriction on veiling, because it would ensure that we are
consistent when we say that “nobody
should tell women what they can wear (or not wear)” is more principled and
starts with the existing situation, which is that a subset of women are currently being told what to wear.
Many women wear the veil because someone has told them that they cannot wear
Western dress, or that not to veil themselves would be in contravention of
religious values. If these women dissent, some of them would face violence,
abuse and homelessness. If we really
want women to be free to “wear whatever they want,” then we must (a) argue against
religious authoritarians who tell women exactly what they must wear (b) stop
allowing the state to prosecute as “hate speech” every attempt to do so, and
(c) possibly erect a legal ban on religious modesty dress to protect those who
are currently coerced to wear it.
Mill’s various responses to the cases above illustrate that mere
offence is not a good reason for society to constrain what people do. Liberals
have never favoured state interference with self-regarding behaviours that
others merely find distasteful. Liberals have only accepted state interference
when the behaviour in question is ‘other-regarding’ (i.e. when it impacts
others in a significant way) and is also harmful.
While it is debatable as to what is or is not harmful, liberals have interpreted
harm in a narrow sense, such that merely insulting the feelings or offending
other people’s tastes or beliefs is not ‘harmful’ in any significant way, since
it does not harm anyone’s permanent interests as a progressive being. On the
other hand, denying people access to education or information, limiting their
freedom of movement or their liberty to assemble with people, or to pursue
their own goals, are acts that do harm other people’s permanent
interests as progressive beings. It
limits the individual’s ability to have genuine options and a variety of
sources of information. This prevents informed decision, constrains ‘education’
within very narrow limits, and ultimately stunts intellectual and personal growth
and development – all of which is seriously
harmful.
Offence, far from injuring my development and growth, may actually
stimulate my thought, provoke new ideas, or challenge me to question my own
assumptions or to defend existing ones with better reasons. On the other hand,
customs, when they are coerced or enforced through family and community
pressure (sometimes violent pressure) do harm peoples’ permanent interests as
progressive and free human agents, capable of exploring their own physical,
emotional and intellectual growth.
For this reason, liberalism has been the best form of government for
allowing individuals to pursue their own good in their own way. The state does
not presume to enforce any moral or ideological code, but rather is treated as
a neutral referee. The state’s sole purpose is to enforce a set of principled
and fair rules so that all ideologies can compete on the same level playing
field and follow the same rules of engagement. When governments act
paternalistically by granting special protections to a particular subculture in
society, they are not protecting individuals within those cultures but lifting
the protections that would otherwise grant them the same rights as other (more
powerful) individuals within their culture.
Liberalism protects all
members of a minority subculture, whereas the kind of faith-based
multiculturalism that liberal states have pursued in the past decade allows
only dominant community leaders to pursue their own values and goals, while
protecting their “right” to impose these values on everyone else in the
community. This is not liberal. It is conservative communitarianism that can
quickly become religious fascism.
