The present BJP-led
NDA government has all along been accused for adopting what is being referred
to as a ‘muscular’ approach while dealing with the situation in Kashmir. But
those who are trying to insinuate that use of strong-arm tactics is a new
phenomenon in Kashmir and that it’s only New Delhi that has been resorting to ‘muscular’
policies are either not conversant with the post-partition history of Kashmir,
or are intentionally choosing to feign ignorance.
The bitter and undeniable
reality is that the very genesis of Kashmir issue in itself is the result of
‘muscular’ approach and even though undesirable, this more than seven-decade
old trend doesn’t seem to have gone out of fashion ever since, as events have
proved.
Operation
Gulmarg (1947-48)
The Maharaja of
Jammu & Kashmir entered into a ‘stand-still agreement’ with Pakistan
immediately after partition. Under this agreement, Pakistan was required to
honour all administrative arrangements that this princely state had with the
British Crown till new arrangements were made. But just nine weeks later,
Pakistan unilaterally reneged this agreement by launching a military campaign
to seize Kashmir and gave this ambitious plan the code name ‘Operation Gulmarg’.
To avoid being censured by the international community for its unprovoked act
of aggression, Pakistan camouflaged this military action by giving it an
appearance of a tribal invasion. Accordingly, armed by Pakistan Army and led by
its regulars in disguise, 20 lashkars (militias) of 1,000 tribesman each, embarked
upon their mission to conquer J&K. But the timely arrival of the Indian Army
and its gallant actions thwarted Pakistan’s plan to forcibly assimilate the
whole of Kashmir.
India had the
military capability of wresting back the areas of Kashmir which Pakistan had
occupied by force and any military action to restore its territorial integrity
was legally and morally sound and justified. However, instead of doing so India
took the matter of Pakistani aggression to UN Security Council and even agreed
to a ceasefire even though the same didn’t make it incumbent on Pakistan to
return the territory under its illegal occupation.
So, isn’t
Operation Gulmarg the first instance when ‘muscular’ approach was used in
Kashmir and doesn’t Pakistan Army rightly deserve the credit for introducing
use of ‘muscle-power’ in Kashmir!
Operation
Gibraltar (1965)
Unable to convince the world that Kashmir rightfully ‘belongs’ to Pakistan, its army once again attempted to seize Kashmir by force. A military plan code named ‘Operation Gibraltar’ was put into action in 1965, which envisaged the use of regular army personnel disguised as civilians supported by a force of 40,000 highly trained and well-armed ‘razakars’ (volunteers) who would secretly enter Kashmir and incite the local population to rebel against New Delhi. According to Lt Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik of Pakistan Army who was one of the architects of Operation Gibraltar, the aim of this military action was “to defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war.”
“Operation Gibraltar”
was the second time that Pakistan used a ‘muscular’ approach in order to get
hold of Kashmir. Here again, rather than following a tough policy, New Delhi agreed
to return those parts of Kashmir that the Indian Army had captured, even though
this was legally Indian territory usurped by Pakistan in 1947-48.
‘Freedom
Struggle’ (1989 onwards)
Islamabad’s
third and most brazen attempt to realise its Kashmir dream came in the form of Islamic
terrorism in the late eighties. Thousands of local boys were taken across the
porous Line of Control (LoC) and after receiving military training were armed
and sent back to fight against security forces. Pakistani nationals were also
sent across to join what they were told was a ‘jihad’ (holy war). In his
well-researched book ‘Shadow Wars’, Arif Jamal mentions that in the early days
of militancy there could have been as many as 180 militant groups operating in
Kashmir and this gives a fair idea about the massive scale of the Pakistan Army
and ISI sponsored enterprise.
Though terrorism
in Kashmir erupted in 1988, instead of coming down on it immediately with an
iron fist, the Government of India continued to try and control the same with
standard regulations meant for maintaining law and order under normal
conditions. It was only after these laws failed to quell Pakistan-sponsored terrorism
that Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was invoked in J&K in 1990.
So, those who consider promulgation of AFSPA to be ‘muscular’ policy need to
realise that AFSPA came into force due to the need to counter Pakistan’s proxy
war.
Though some
nations and international bodies may occasionally air objections to AFSPA, but
none of them will initiate or support concerted action to seek its removal
since the world community sympathises with nations bearing the brunt of terrorism
and appreciates the fact that security forces dealing with terrorism do require
special provisions and safeguards to fight this menace threatening humanity.
Operation
Vijay (1999)
Pakistan Army’s
plan of large-scale intrusions across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kargil
sector and occupying posts vacated by Indian Army during winters so as to alter
alignment of the LoC was the fourth instance of ‘muscular’ approach being
applied by it in the J&K. Here again the Pakistan Army tried to deceive the
world into believing that the intruders were Kashmiri “freedom fighters” and in
order to hide the truth, stooped to a new low by disowning the dead bodies of
their own soldiers killed in action. But its bluff was soon called and the
Pakistan Army had to suffer another ignominy of being declared the aggressor
and having to withdraw to its own side of the LoC.
Despite
Pakistan’s brazen use of muscular power in Kargil, India’s reaction to these
intrusions was both measured and localised, which has been highly appreciated
by the international community since it didn’t escalate into a full-blown war
between two nuclear states. This was in sharp contrast to what Pakistan did in
1965 when it launched ‘Operation Grand Slam’ to capture Akhnoor even as its
Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir was in progress. By doing so, Pakistan enlarged
the scope of the conflict and this resulted in a full-scale war between India
and Pakistan.
Who’s to
blame?
Is Kashmir a
victim of ‘muscular’ policy? The answer is ‘Yes’. But is New Delhi responsible
for the ‘muscular’ policy in Kashmir? The answer is an emphatic ‘No’. If armed
groups fire upon security forces, then is firing back at them adopting a
‘muscular’ policy? When terrorists refuse the offer to surrender and start a
gunfight with security forces, then is retaliation ‘muscular’ approach? When
Pakistan supported terrorists indiscriminately use ‘muscular’ means in a bid to
create a state of anarchy in Kashmir, does invoking AFSPA indicate a ‘muscular’
approach?
Conversely, isn’t
the barbaric act of terrorists abducting, torturing and killing innocent
civilians ‘muscular approach’? Isn’t posting graphic ‘execution’ videos on
social media to terrorise and intimidate the people ‘muscular policy’? Doesn’t the
cowardly act of terrorists attacking unarmed policemen on traffic regulation
duties amount to ‘muscular approach’? Aren’t vigilante squads formed by youth
to enforce shutdown calls given by the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) ‘muscular’
tactics? Isn’t stone pelting and acts of arson during protests the
manifestation of a ‘muscular approach’?
With terrorists openly
using guns, grenades, bombs and Hurriyat leaders inciting mob violence in order
to achieve a political objective does one still requires to be told who’s
guilty of giving resolution of the Kashmir issue a ‘muscular approach’?
